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Arctic geopolitics is a moving target - and Greenland, determined to emerge as a sover-
eign nation state, is a particularly dynamic case. The choices currently made in language 
policy about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English languages will put 
Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence. The article modi-
fies the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen School Securitization Theory to 
produce a nuanced picture of national identity politics, the tensions involved, and sce-




Greenland might be an enormous island, but it is also a people of only 56,000 persons. 
As such, it will be in need of partners and allies in most of the fields in which a modern 
nation state and welfare society engages: goods ranging from foodstuff to industrial ma-
chines, services ranging from education to military alliances, and human resources in 
most specialized trades. Given the way in which current global upheavals in both climate, 
power, and commerce change Greenland's position on the globe, a sovereign Greenlandic 
state will not be acting in a vacuum when choosing where to shift its dependencies. Nev-
ertheless, a prognosis of Greenland's future maneuvering in Arctic and international pol-
itics must take as its point of departure the way in which Greenland envisions its core 
identity. Independence, according to Greenlandic identity discourse, is meant to allow the 
                                                            
1 I am grateful for comments on an early version of this paper from Iben Bjørnsson, Martin Breum, Danita 
Burke, Naja Graugaard, Victoria Hermann, Marc Jacobsen, Uffe Jakobsen, Lars Jensen, Jon Rahbek-Clem-
mensen, and an anonymous reviewer for Politik. The basic arguments of this article - both concerning 
analytical strategy and Greenlandic national identity - hark back to my master's thesis analysing the 2002 
Greenlandic debates on language, available as Gad (2005). The central conclusions of that part of the em-
pirical analysis were published in English in (Gad 2009a), and the acknowledgments extended in Gad 
(2005, fn. 1) still apply. A more detailed version of the 2016 empirical analysis presented in this paper is 
available in Danish in Gad (forthcoming).  
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unfolding of Greenland's true self, free from colonial domination. However, what can this 
self-identity tell us about the course of a future Greenlandic state? 
Decades of philosophical, historical, sociological, and anthropological research 
into nationalism has taught us that even if cultural and political similarities and differ-
ences might be coalescing, national identity does not exist (Fink 1991). Only national 
identification exists (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14ff; Hall 1996, 2) as a re-iterative, 
Janus-faced process: 'We' identify with characteristics and ideals which each of 'Us' be-
lieve our compatriots to share - while defining ourselves in contrast to traits and ideals 
we believe characterize 'Them'; others, who are not 'Us'. However, rarely do we agree on 
the specifics of our identity nor on what differentiates ‘Us’ from ‘Them’. Even if ethnog-
raphers, scholarly and lay, have produced detailed accounts of 'Eskimo culture' and 
'Greenlandic political culture' with no consensus, the future course of Greenland is deter-
mined by a political negotiation of 'who we are' and how to realize the ideal. Current 
debates about language policy are, at the core, about 'whom we should be.’ The choices 
made in these negotiations about how to prioritize the Greenlandic, Danish, and English 
languages will put Greenland on very different routes towards and beyond independence. 
Empirically, this article shows how a future sovereign Greenlandic state will set 
out to be a democratic welfare state. But it also shows how it will face internal struggles 
over the character of its democracy and society: whether it will be a linguistically exclu-
sive community risking its character as a Nordic welfare society, or if it will be an inclu-
sive community reneging its cultural identity. In providing this analysis, the article 
demonstrates how one may appropriate the analytical strategy prescribed by Copenhagen 
School Securitization Theory (hereafter CSST) to produce a nuanced picture of national 
identity politics. The focus of the analysis is on public and political debates on language 
policy, since both Greenlanders and scholars agree that the command of kalaallisut [the 
Greenlandic language] has for more than a century been core to discussions about what 
constitutes Greenlandic identity (Thomsen 1996, 270; Sørensen 1994, 108; Sejersen 
1999, 126ff; Langgård 2002, 77). After introducing a few basic elements of how nation, 
state, language, and identity relate - in theory and in Greenland - the article offers an 
approach to modify the CSST apparatus for analyzing identity politics. The article then 
moves on to analyze three pairs of threat narratives present in the Greenlandic debate on 
language: Two threats to democracy; two threats of exclusion, continuing to take aim at 
the overall evolution of Greenlandic society; and, finally, two radically different ways of 
articulating the English language in order to escape the dilemmas and tensions produced 
in the bilateral relation between Greenland/Denmark. The article concludes by formulat-
ing three scenarios for how a potential sovereign Greenlandic nation state could constitute 
itself linguistically - prioritizing Greenlandic, Danish, or English - and how the linguistic 
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Nation, state, language, and identity in theory and in Greenland 
 
In the Arctic, both the modern state and the concept of nation arrived rather late - and 
white colonizers imported both (Dahl 2016; Thuesen 1988). In Greenland, the notion of 
sharing an identity, whether national or ethnic, as Greenlanders was the result of meeting 
qallunaat [white people]. Since Denmark gradually became capable of enforcing the mo-
nopoly it granted itself on trading in Greenland, Danes became the qallunaat in relation 
to whom Greenlanders defined their identity (Sørensen 1994, 109; Dorais 1996, 29). As 
self-appointed naalagaat [those who decide over others], Danes came to take up the po-
sition of the radical other of Greenland: the other which at once constituted and compro-
mised Greenlandic identity (cf. Žižek 1992, 197; Wæver 1994, 18). Upon their arrival, 
the Danes decided that vis-à-vis Greenlanders, difference needed to be upheld. Green-
landers would be best off by sticking to hunting seal (and the Danish fur trade would 
benefit too). Meanwhile, the nation building process, which took place during the 19th 
Century in a number of European countries, was copy-pasted in Greenland with surpris-
ingly little delay, and with an important linguistic twist compared to other colonial soci-
eties. According to Danish theologian N.F S. Grundtvig, national elevation (the only true 
way to relate to God) demanded the education of the common man in his own language. 
In Greenland, this meant the education of Greenlanders as catechists, capable of receiving 
education via the Danish language, in order to teach both the gospel and general enlight-
enment in Greenlandic to their compatriots along the coast. This new class of hybrids 
became parties to the early 1900 kalaaliussuseq-debate [on what constituted Greenlandic 
identity] conducted in the Greenlandic newspapers. Here, the traditional elite of piniar-
torsuit [great hunters] argued (agreeing with the Danes) that being expert sealers was 
what distinguished Greenlanders. In the end, however, the new intellectual class (the cat-
echists) was included in national identity; fluency in the language of the land became 
accepted as a central criterion for being Greenlandic.2 A century later, command of the 
two languages is still central "in this ethno-political universe [where] Greenlandicness 
and Danishness are experienced and used as each other's negation" (Sørensen 1991, 48; 
my translation.). 
Identity does not pre-exist by itself. Rather it has to be produced and reproduced 
in an ongoing negotiation. Each idea of someone being identical is the result of a contin-
gent process in which some traits are prioritized over others; i.e., a political process. In 
the politics of identity production, two mechanisms work in tandem: reification and se-
curitization. You point out something as threatened and thereby affirm and solidify the 
existence of this something in the first place (Wæver 1994; Buzan et al. 1998, ch. 6). The 
basic story told in Greenlandic identity discourse is one that takes its point of departure 
in noting how Danes caused the decline of original Inuit culture. Even if a Greenlandic 
elite cheered,3 'development' and 'modernization' are essentially apprehended as 'Danish'. 
Hence, in scholarly analyses as well as in public debates in both Greenland and Denmark, 
                                                            
2 For the details and effect of the kalaaliussuseq debate, cf. Petterson (2014); Langgård (2003). 
3 Like elites elsewhere in the later stages of colonial projects, cf. Manniche (2003). 
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the relation between modernization and Greenlandization is often presented as a dichot-
omous choice: Either you do the one, or you do the other. This conclusion is apparent if 
one focuses on language. Part of integration into the Danish state in 1953 was the priori-
tization of the Danish to secure modernization. Integral to the introduction of home rule 
in 1979 was giving priority to Greenlandic. 
In effect, the result was a dual track primary education system, presenting par-
ents and teachers at particularly urban schools with the choice of putting children in 
Greenlandic or Danish classes. Often teachers and parents, Greenlandic or mixed Dan-
ish/Greenlandic couples, prioritized the Danish language with a view to securing their 
children the best options for further education. In smaller settlements, the language of 
instruction depended on what teachers were available. In the 50’s and 60’s, teachers 
mainly consisted of Danes; currently, teachers are mostly Greenlanders. No reliable sta-
tistics exist on the language capabilities of the Greenlandic population, but, roughly 
speaking, the majority of the population (particularly outside the capital, Nuuk) is by now 
functionally monolingual Greenlandic speakers, with a large minority more or less bilin-
gual and a rather small, but mostly well-educated minority speaking Danish but not 
Greenlandic (Arbejdsgruppen 2002, 30; Gad 2005). English competencies more or less 
follow Danish competencies and the general level of education. 
This predicament sits uneasy with the ideal, imported from Denmark, that the 
best way to be part of the world involves having your own culturally homogenous nation 
state (Gad 2016). The point of departure to demand Greenlandization remains the decline 
of an original Inuit culture faced with Danish colonization. But no one wants to return to 
pre-colonial hunting culture. Rather, Greenlandic national identity discourse involves the 
standard nationalist idea that resurrecting the fallen, golden past in the future can only 
conclude in the form of a nation state, and this involves development and modernization. 
The Greenlandization narrative needs to articulate symbolic elements of Inuit culture - 
particularly language - to elements of modernity: formalized education, outboard motors, 
and the internet. Greenlandization means modernization performed in Greenlandic rather 
than in Danish. However, picking the right elements of tradition and modernization is 
fraught with dilemmas and tensions. Particularly after securing Danish acceptance of the 
formal right to secession in 2009, political debates in Greenland have turned to ways of 
finding alternative sources of revenue to escape dependence on the annual 'block grant' 
from Denmark. After the hype of a mining adventure was academically debunked (Rosing 
et al. 2014), whether politically accepted in Nuuk or not, an oil bonanza is left as the only 
credible shortcut to a self-supporting economy. However, the intensified ambition to shift 
Greenlandic identity politics away from focusing solely on the bilateral relation to Den-
mark has involved a re-articulation of some of the dilemmas and tensions. When analyz-
ing both the shift and the underlying dilemmas and tensions, Copenhagen School securit-
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Reading identity politics as threats and defense  
 
The authoritative Copenhagen School definition of a securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan 
et al. 1998; cf. Jacobsen and Herrmann this issue) involves the participation of two dis-
tinct actors. A securitizing agent performs a 'securitizing move,’ a statement rhetorically 
constructing an existential threat to a valued referent-object while advocating an extraor-
dinary measure to avert the threat. And a relevant audience accepts that this extraordinary 
measure may be adopted. If both elements, move and accept, are present, a successful 
'textbook' securitization has occurred and the social situation of the issue at hand has 
changed from a politicized or even a non-politicized to a securitized one. However, the 
basic proposition of this article is that focusing only on successful securitizations is an 
extravagance we should not allow ourselves. Of course, the Copenhagen School is correct 
in stating that 'security' constitutes a realm both exclusive and explosive, hence, it is im-
portant to know how any specific subject has indeed come to be securitized. We can learn 
more from studying unsuccessful or partial securitizations. First, less-than-successful se-
curitizing moves provide important information about how to avoid full securitization, 
not least because even less-than-successful securitizations may spark security dynamics 
(Wæver 2009b). Second, the close relation between security and identity (Wæver 1994; 
Buzan et al. 1998, ch. 6) means that the rhetorical figure at the core of a securitizing move 
may serve as a valuable lens for studying political identity negotiations. If done in a struc-
tured way, this may feed into analyses of not just security dynamics but also the dynamics 
and results coming out of identity politics - i.e., the political construction of identities. In 
other words: by listening to what is pointed out as threats to what, we may learn what is 
important to an identity in question. By looking at how threats and measures to their 
aversion are constructed in relation to valued referent-objects, we can learn about how 
identities evolve. 
In contrast to an 'orthodox' implementation of Copenhagen School analytical 
strategy, this article makes three amendments. First, we relax the demand that threats need 
to be existential and measures extraordinary. Both thresholds, extraordinary and existen-
tial, are conceptually challenging to define and have proven problematic to establish in 
empirical analyses.4 Second, we observe the sequences of measures-threats-referent-ob-
jects as narratives. In a formal sense, measures have the same relation to threats as threats 
                                                            
 
4 The distinction between existential and 'non-existential' threats very much depends on the definition of 
the referent-object: Any threat can be taken as existential in relation to a referent-object specified in the 
'right' way. A malaria mosquito may credibly be pointed out as an existential threat to the life of a human 
being. A regular mosquito could be posed as an existential threat to the wellbeing of a human being. A 
swarm of mosquitos may pose an existential threat to the possibility of enjoying spectacular Greenlandic 
nature - and to the tourism business. And because of the paradoxical character of identity, it is impossible 
to dismiss up front that any potential diacriticon will be pointed out as essential to the identity at hand. For 
instance, the Greenlandic language lacks its own name for numbers from 13 and up. A politician explicitly 
points out the fact that Greenlandic speakers use Danish numbers as a threat to Greenlandic identity 
(Inatsisartut 2002.04.19, 60). In theory, only the audience can decide whether it accepts this threat as exis-
tential for the referent-object in question (Buzan et al. 1998, 31). In parallel, the operationalization of the 
limit between 'normal' and 'extraordinary' "remains insufficient" for application by analysts, wherefore "[i]n 
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have to referent-objects. When pointing out a threat, you prognosticate a negative effect 
of something on a referent-object. When suggesting a means to avert a threat, you prog-
nosticate or promise that the means will have a negative effect on the threat. Moreover, 
the measure will have an indirect, positive effect on the survival of the referent-object. 
Hence, the analytics employed in this article read CSST's rhetorical figure of 'measures-
threats-objects' as a narrative chain of causes and effects that, in the end, point out a val-
ued referent-object. When an argument advocates measures against threats (or just points 
out threats), it only works rhetorically with an audience because the referent-object is 
valued because who 'we' are is important. In a final step, we tend to the reaction of the 
audience. However, contrary to a basic securitization analysis, we are not (only) interested 
in whether an audience confirms or completes the process of securitization by accepting 
the possible use of extraordinary means.5 Rather, like in a more advanced CSST analysis 
                                                            
the application on concrete cases, quite hopeless debates often emerge on whether something is 'ordinary' 
or 'extra-ordinary'." (Wæver 2003, 26; cf. Werner 1998). However, as we will see below, the delimitation 
of the ordinary is not just a technical problem for the analyst; often the question of whether a proposed 
means is ordinary or extreme is core to the empirical politics. E.g., a denial of voting rights to people who 
only speak Danish constitutes an extraordinary suppression of basic democratic rights, provided that one 
brings to the table a concept of democracy based on individual rights. But the same denial constitutes a 
natural and ordinary way of respecting and upholding the cultural specificity of a people - if the point of 
departure is a concept of democracy based on the rights of an ethnically defined community. 
 
5 This amendment relates to critical discussions of CSST, however, the position taken in this article is only 
feasible because the object of study is not security per se, but identity politics. CSST advocates a focus on 
the illocutionary force of the speech act: a securitizing speech act is complete and successful if an audience 
is compelled to accept a hypothetical implementation of extraordinary means. Hence, the audience is at 
once decisive (Wæver 2003, 11) and passive: only if a relevant audience explicitly denies accept, the analyst 
may safely conclude that the securitizing move was not successful (Buzan et al. 1998, 26; cf. Derrida 1982, 
8; Austin 1997, 65). Moreover, more than one audience may show itself to be relevant by denying accept 
of a proposed extraordinary means (cf. Wæver 2003, 26; Roe 2008). If the Greenlandic parliament adopts 
an extraordinary measure - e.g., prohibiting members from speaking Danish in parliament - the electorate 
may show itself to be a relevant audience denying accept at the next general elections. Or the Danish state 
may, in the form of the Danish High Court denying the constitutionality of the decision. Or an international 
body like the European Court of Human Rights. The present article escapes these complications by focusing 
on the perlocutionary consequences of the construction of threats and defensive means; i.e., the explicit 
responses to such claims. One strand of critique takes the CSST focus on the illocutionary force of a secu-
ritizing speech act to deny the relevance of the audience (cf. Gad and Petersen 2011). It claims that Wæver's 
concept of security equals Schmitt's concept of politics, and warns that both involve the idea that agency is 
concentrated in one authority able to assert its will top-down: A powerful actor installs security by decla-
ration. As an alternative to this (skewed) rendition of CSST, critics advocate and produce analyses account-
ing for all the little acts of small agents or for the underlying structures, which co-produce a given securit-
ization (Gad and Petersen 2011). Such self-proclaimed 'sociological' securitization analyses, of course, are 
valuable in directing attention towards minor agents to hold accountable for unjust distribution of insecurity 
and towards structures to change to escape surveillance and mal-governance. However, applying securiti-
zation theory - whether in the 'sociological' version or à la Wæver - as a checklist for successful securitiza-
tion misses one important point: unsuccessful and partially successful securitizing moves and outright mis-
fires also provide valuable information for understanding security dynamics (Wæver 1995). Moreover, it 
allows us to understand important dynamics of broader identity politics. First, because interactive dynamics 
may arise from less-than-successful securitizations. Second, less-than-perfect securitizing moves may tell 
us about the limits of identity discourses and how they are negotiated. In combination, interactive dynamics 
and discursive limits provide the foundation for building prognoses of future politics. Recent ST writings 
by Wæver seem to be bifurcated. Either an article is more or less explicitly engaged in an exchange with 
the 'sociological version' of ST defending an illocutionary version of speech acts of securitization and a 
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of dynamics of securitizations, the 'audience' is relevant also when suggesting alternative 
narratives of cause-and-effect, pointing out other threats, means and/or referent-objects 
(whether or not this amounts to formal counter-securitizations by posing alternative exis-
tential threats and extraordinary means). The point is, that alternative narratives of cause 
and effect point out alternative referent-objects as valued, indicating alternative identity 
constructions.  
Scholarly consensus insists that the Greenlandic language is 'alive and well', par-
ticularly when compared with other indigenous languages.6 Nevertheless, securitizing 
moves that point to Danish language as a threat is a recurrent feature of Greenlandic pol-
itics. This observation confirms the image of Denmark as Greenland's threatening other. 
However, casting the analytical net just a little bit broader and reading the debate on lan-
guage policy and threats comprehensively point to other referent-objects that make for a 
much more nuanced image. This provides us with more information to use when trying 
to understand just what a future Greenland might aspire to be. The remainder of this arti-
cle analyses the 2002 and 2016 debates on language in the Greenlandic parliament 
(Inatsisartut) and newspapers (Sermitsiaq and A/G) through the CSST lenses as modified 
above.7 On the one hand, the years 2002 and 2016 are not special. Language policy is a 
recurrent issue in debates on how to realize the best kind of Greenland. On the other hand, 
the formal change of status for the Greenlandic autonomy arrangement in 2009 involved 
a formal change of status for the Greenlandic language: Whereas the 1978 Home Rule 
Act declared that, "Greenlandic shall be the principal language. Danish must be thor-
oughly taught. Either language may be used for official purposes." (section 9), the 2009 
Self-Government Act declares Greenlandic to be "the official language in Greenland" 
without mentioning the Danish language. Moreover, Inatsisartut in 2010 adopted a long-
debated Act on language policy aiming primarily to "secure the Greenlandic language as 
a language, complete and supporting the society" (section 1) by prescribing that all public 
agencies and private enterprises employing more than 10 persons formulate a language 
policy (section 4) and by awarding every resident in Greenland the "right to learn Green-
landic and Danish as well as a language of international reach".8 However, the shift of 
focus for the overall debate on the next steps towards independence, from formal recog-
nition and self-government to substantial self-support in terms of economy and human 
resources, appears to have made more of a difference to the way weights have shifted 
between the threats pointed out, the means suggested, and the definitions of Greenlandic 
identity promoted. Below, a few central threat constructions will be explicitly dissected 
                                                            
collective interpretation of Austin's account of illocution (Wæver 2011; 2015). Alternatively, it employs 
securitization theory in analyses of security dynamics playing out as series of speech acts from different 
securitizing agents (Buzan and Wæver 2009; Wæver 2009a; Wæver 2009b; Wæver and Sheikh 2012).  
6 Arbejdsgruppen (2002, 36); Langgård (2003, 215); A/G (2016.12.07, 2); Langgård in A/G (2016.12.07, 
4). 
7 Gad (2005, ch. 3.3.1) discusses the delimitation, drawbacks and benefits of selecting this archive for 
analysis. 
8 The 2010 Act does retain the 1978 formula that "The Danish language may be used for public purposes." 
(section 3), however, contrary to 2009, the possible reform of this status is a purely internal matter for 
Greenland. 
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according to the reading strategy developed above; but most of the analytical work will 
be presented in a synthesized form. 9 
 
Pointing out threats in Greenlandic debates on language  
 
As part of 2016 Inatsisartut deliberations on the import of foreign workers, MP Hans 
Enoksen put forward the ambitious "final demand" that, "you have to be able to speak 
Greenlandic to have a job in the public sector. This will strengthen our identity. ... In this 
way, we will create a proud people working for its own country. In this way, we can 
establish the state of Greenland."10 Even if Enoksen did not name it explicitly, in the 
context of decades of debate it is clear that a threat comes from the Danish language. 
Interventions in parliamentary and media debate frequently point out the position of the 
Danish language in most formal institutions in Greenland as a threat to the interests of 
individual Greenlandic speaking monolinguals. It is difficult or impossible to get jobs in 
the public and private sector or to get an education if you only speak Greenlandic because 
'the system' speaks Danish. However, as Enoksen makes clear, the referent-object of the 
threat goes beyond the individual. The way in which Danish language has pushed aside 
Greenlandic threatens both national pride and the ability of Greenlanders to work for the 
realization of their national ambition. Enoksen's demand may be comparatively ambi-
tious, but it resonates with well-established narratives about threats, valuables, and de-
fensive means. 
 Nevertheless, almost a decade of 'Self-Government' focusing on economic di-
versification and limiting economic dependency to prepare for formal independence have 
re-configured the Greenlandic debates on language. Even if most narratives of threats and 
defense remain recognizable from earlier years, Enoksen's position is indicative of the 
way in which the weight seems to have shifted in the debate. In 2002, Enoksen was the 
newly elected chair of the ruling social democratic Siumut party, and the campaign before 
the general elections in December that year was dominated by his low-voiced support for 
the principle, long pushed mainly by the left-wing nationalist Inuit Ataqatigiit party, that 
the Inatsisartut rostrum should be reserved for the Greenlandic language. In 2016, he was 
leading Partii Naleraq, a small but vocal opposition party, pushing an ambitious demand 
concerning most of the Greenlandic labor market. Meanwhile, the language debate pre-
occupying both parliament and press concerns whether and how to introduce English as 
the second language instead of Danish. In what follows, the article presents three close-
ups of three configurations of threat constructions: 
 
• the threats conjured up to delimit the Greenlandic nation eligible to take part in 
democratically determining its own future;  
                                                            
 
9 Detailed empirical references documenting the 2002 and 2016 analyses respectively are available in Gad 
(2005) and (forthcoming). 
10 Enoksen in A/G (2016.10.19, 12); Inatsisartut (2016.10.12, 49) 
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• the threats posed from linguistic (in)competencies towards the dual processes of 
Greenlandization and modernization, both necessary to realize a future Green-
landic nation state;  
• and the recently promoted switch to English as a way of escaping the latter di-
lemma. 
 
Greenland – ethnic or civic democracy 
 
From the arguments put forward during the 2002 electoral campaign in support of the 
demand that the Inatsiartut rostrum should be reserved for the Greenlandic language, one 
can read an idea of democracy as tightly connected to an ethno-cultural community. The 
members of such a community have the right to decide its own future without outside 
interference. The regular use of the Danish language is presented as a threat to both im-
portant qualities of Greenlandic identity and to the Greenlandic people’s hard-won ability 
to protect them, “we have now [acquired] home rule, because we …. wanted to take care 
of our culture and language ourselves, and to strengthen them” (Heinrich in Sermitsiaq 
2002.11.15, 22). However, the demand sparked a storm of reactions. Opponents described 
the exclusion as a threat to both democratic values and to the quality of democratic debate. 
Primarily, the demand was described as a threat to individual rights to be heard by and 
take part in a democratic, political process. Namely, “our democracy” will be threatened 
if “Danish speakers are denied their fundamental right to express themselves” (A/G 
2002.11.05, 2).    
These two narratives, about Danish language as a threat to ethno-cultural democ-
racy and about the prohibition of the Danish language as a threat to individual democratic 
rights, feed into each other. Any articulation of one narrative challenged the foundation 
of the other and vice versa. The realization of ethno-cultural democracy threatens the 
democratic rights of Danish speaking monolingual individuals. If the rights of Danish 
speakers are accommodated, the ethno-cultural ideal of democracy is compromised. On 
the one hand, the civic and the ethno-cultural narratives agree that democracy and demo-
cratic debate is a referent-object so valuable that it needs to be defended. In that sense, 
being a democracy is part of Greenlandic national identity: No-one imagines a future 
Greenland that is not democratic. On the other hand, the two narratives clearly disagree 
about what constitutes democracy, or rather, about how to delimit the community which 
must be democratic. Is the future Greenlandic democracy for everyone who live in Green-
land, or is it for those who fulfil certain linguistic or ethnic criteria making them legitimate 
Greenlanders? This disagreement installs a tension in Greenlandic identity discourse be-
tween the universally accepted 'democracy' and the traditional diachriticon 'Greenlandic 
language'. 
 
National welfare - Greenlandization and/or modernization 
 
Pointing out Danish language as a threat to individual Greenlandic speakers opens two 
solutions, an individual and a collective. First, the threat may be interpreted in such a way 
that it is not 'the Danish speaking system' which constitutes the threat, but rather the fact 
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that the individual in question is monolingual, the societal solution to which is then to 
teach individuals Danish in more efficient ways. However, the Danish language is pointed 
out as a threat to more heavily loaded referent-objects than individuals. At its most basic 
level, Danish language is presented as a threat to the Greenlandic language as such: The 
presence of Danish impedes the development of Greenlandic to function in certain sectors 
of society. Such 'domain losses' contribute to the threat against the formal position of 
Greenlandic, and this in turn is a threat to the dignity of the Greenlandic language. Par-
ticularly, its dignity is threatened when Danish migrants and Danish speaking Greenland-
ers "couldn't be bothered" (Poulsen in Sermitsiaq (2002.02.15, 28); Matthiassen in Ser-
mitsiaq (2002.05.03, 26); Heilmann in Sermitsiaq (2002.11.28, 38). Learning to speak 
Greenlandic. As "the Greenlandic language is our soul" (Olsen in Sermitsiaq 2002.11.22, 
41); cf. Sørensen (1994, 109)., the threat to the function, position and status of the Green-
landic language really take aim at the identity, equal worth, and dignity of the Greenlandic 
people. Indeed, a Greenlander has the right to be able to live a life with the language of 
the land only. The Greenlandic and Danish languages need to have equal status, not on 
Greenlandic territory, but equal in being superior in each their territory. The conclusion 
to this narrative, describing the second, collective solution to the threat coming from lack 
of Danish competencies vis-à-vis a Danish speaking 'system', is a total linguistic Green-
landization of education, administration, and businesses. 
However, the narrative of Greenlandization clashes with a narrative of modern-
ization. At the basis of this narrative is the impression that the Danish language is a pre-
condition for knowledge and vision in general and for education in particular. Next, vision 
and education is presented as a precondition for employment at an individual scale and 
for enterprise at a societal scale. The narrative reached its climax when the lack of capa-
bilities in the Danish language was pointed out as a threat to Greenland's development 
towards emerging as an independent welfare state. Specifically, the narrative of exclusion 
of Danish speaking monolinguals voiced in opposition to the reservation of the 
Inatsisartut rostrum continued along this line, since their exclusion would mean that in-
dividuals migrate to Denmark or do not repatriate after studying abroad. Even without 
brain drain, exclusion may threaten the quality of democratic deliberation. Further, low 
quality deliberation means low quality solutions to a host of specific societal problems, 
and consequently less development and less welfare. Like democracy, welfare is a refer-
ent-object worth defending. Welfare is an indispensable element in Greenlandic identity 
(cf. Langgård 2003, 250; Larsen 1992, 223).  
 
Modernizing without the Danish language 
 
So, on the one hand, renouncing on being a modern welfare state would contradict Green-
land's basic vision of itself. On the other hand, the main medium both for abstract mod-
ernization and for concrete manning of the welfare state, the Danish language is, consti-
tutively per definition, a threat to Greenlandic identity. No surprise, then, that a classic 
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(Engell 1982, 168f) discussion within the overall Greenlandic debate on language con-
cerns the possibility of accessing the joys of modernization via English rather than Dan-
ish. No consensus exists on the subject, however. In 2002, the English language was rou-
tinely mentioned as a road to modernity along the Danish one, and at times as an occa-
sional add-on to Danish when mentioning the need to facilitate openness to secondary 
and tertiary education. However, in 2016, a new turn of the narrative had moved the Dan-
ish language to the role so far reserved for the Greenlandic, namely that of a provincial 
language threatening to limit Greenland's access to global modernity. Correspondingly, 
the English language ascended to the role of primary means to mend that threat. The 
coalition agreement claimed that, "we as a nation will be in a stronger position by having 
a world language as second language. Such a change will bring us closer to the goal that 
Greenland should have more options to choose from globally and in commerce" (Olsen 
in Sermitsiaq 2002.11.22, 41); cf. Sørensen (1994, 109).  A couple of young Siumut mem-
bers explained the connection between Danish and English, "The Danish language is 
dominating too much in Greenland and it is directly impeding when it comes to com-
municating with the rest of the world ... [T]he Danish language is directly the cause for 
many Greenlanders having difficulties in learning English".11 Hence, a Siumut MP pro-
posed that English should substitute Danish as primary foreign language, arguing that, 
"The children and the young ones are our future. Therefore, it is only natural, that we 
open their world out towards the gates of the great outer world, since this is the only way 
we can harvest a better and updated knowledge in the future."12 A Siumut spokesman laid 
out the proportions, "[T]he Danish language is a language for six million Danes. But a 
billion people around the world understands the English language" (Langgård in A/G 
2016.12.07, 4). 
A host of words of caution were issued in opposition in both parliament and 
press. Added to threats of exclusion of Danish speakers were warnings about Greenland 
losing access to free education in Denmark, and that neither the teachers nor schoolbooks 
were anything near ready. More radically, English was presented as a threat to Green-
landic language and identity more powerful and severe than Danish: 
 
"English is already washing over the society as a flood. At worst, the 
dikes may break and flood the Greenlandic language ... If a central de-
cision to decisively embrace English is taken, one just need to know 
that one will be nourishing a snake in one’s bosom. I do not know a 
single minority language in the world that has survived alongside the 
English". (Langgård in A/G 2016.12.07, 4) 
 
                                                            
11 Johansen & Sandgreen in sermitziaq.ag (2016.03.16). Accessible at: http://sermitsiaq.ag/siumut-
ungdom-danske-sprog-haemmer [Accessed 3 July 2017]. 
12 Motzfeldt in Inatsisartut (2016.04.21/38) (clash of metaphors in org.) 
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Nevertheless, an ensuing Inatsisartut debate concluded that English could be introduced 
in the first year of primary school alongside Danish. The Minister for Education, repre-
senting the moderate Demokraatit party which was briefly a coalition partner, even sug-
gested that the point of departure for her follow-up on the debate would be to implement 
the change within two years.  
 
Conclusion and perspectives: Kuwait, Luxembourg, or Iceland?  
 
Greenlandic identity revolves not only around 'Greenlandic culture.’ It also includes de-
mocracy, sovereignty, and, in particular, welfare. Greenlandic identity politics is all about 
how to combine which symbolic elements of a 'native' Greenlandic culture with these 
elements of modernization. A future sovereign Greenlandic state will set out to be a dem-
ocratic welfare state. But the use of Danish language is seen as a threat to the dignity and 
integrity of a Greenlandic nation imagining its true incarnation to be culturally homoge-
nous and, thus, speaking Greenlandic. Greenland is facing tough struggles with itself over 
the character of its democracy and society. The attempts to combine indigeneity and mo-
dernity create important tensions that then appear in the discourse. Particularly, when the 
demand for prioritizing Greenlandic language is put forward in absolute ways, tensions 
arise in relation to welfare and independence. One option is that Greenland insists on 
being an ethnically defined nation. This would imply that it risks its welfare character by 
pushing away people who only speak Danish, including immigrants from the former co-
lonial power and even more problematically Danish speakers who consider themselves 
Greenlanders. Another option would be fully to convert itself into a civic conception of 
nationhood, including all citizens on equal terms regardless of linguistic competence. 
This would mean putting at risk the cultural identity legitimizing and spurring the quest 
for independence in the first place. 
The article specified this fundamental dilemma by applying a strategy for ana-
lyzing identity political negotiations, developed by modifying CSST, on Greenlandic de-
bates on language, a core element in Greenlandic identity discourse. On the one hand, 
this analysis alone cannot form the basis of predictions for how the future of a Green-
landic state will be. First, because it has dealt only with the self-perception and ideals of 
Greenland without taking into account the perceptions and ideals of neighbors and more 
distant relations. No nations form their future in a vacuum or unilaterally re-casts the 
globe in their own image (even if one could get that impression from listening to national 
political debates). On the other hand, no scenarios of a future Arctic would be valid with-
out taking into account the specific aspirations and ideals of Greenland. Second, the anal-
ysis presented has limited itself to one topic: language policy. This is only one of a series 
of discussions decisive for the future course of Greenland, but it is indeed a fundamental 
question. Both because it represents deeply sedimented parts of the self-image of Green-
land and implicates almost all sectors of society. Moreover, the choice and priority of 
languages have severe consequences for what kind of society may materialize, and how 
it will engage the international as part of a new Arctic. 
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To build scenarios, parallel cases may serve as a guide. Parallels are never perfect because 
every case is unique. However, it appears particularly difficult to find a relevant 'peer 
group' of which to make Greenland a case. A population similar in size to the smallest 
sovereign islands, typically scattered in tropical seas, only Greenlanders inhabit stretches 
of the coast of an Arctic island almost the size of India (home to a billion people) or the 
Caribbean Sea ('home' to 13 sovereign states and 15 more or less self-governing depend-
encies). Nevertheless, for the sake of opening up our imaginations (Øverland and Neu-
mann 2004; Gad 2009b), rather than comparative analysis, three countries could serve as 
'end points' for three narratives continuing from where the Greenlandic debates on lan-
guage is at present. All three continuations work on the (fragile) condition that Greenland 
finds ways to both finance welfare (i.e., strikes oil) and develops human resources. In real 
life, of course, these conditions intertwine intimately with the question of language, but 
to focus attention on one important choice (that of language), we bracket everything else. 
Default must always be a status quo scenario. In this case, default means priori-
tizing the teaching of and in Greenlandic while paying lip service to the importance of a 
second language. If Greenland continues the linguistic policies of the last three decades 
and suddenly hits a major oil deposit, Greenland will be the Kuwait of the Arctic. Green-
landic welfare will be secured; all Greenlanders will be at leisure. Formally, Greenlanders 
will be in charge, but substantially expat experts will run the country, probably most of 
them on relatively short contracts. Possibly, there will be a quite high level of corruption 
and slack, but no one cares. There is enough for all Greenlanders, and the expats do not 
need to commit as they are looking to move on. Below, a huge proletariat of disenfran-
chised foreign menial workers not socially integrated. In terms of geopolitics, such a lin-
guistic and ethno-political strategy would make Greenland like most third world countries 
dependent on one or a few natural resources, as free to switch allegiance from one super 
power to another as the constellation of superpowers of the day allow. 
If Greenland adds fluency in Danish to Greenlandic, Greenland will be an Arctic 
equivalent of Luxembourg. Attractive to Scandinavian and Icelandic immigrants and am-
bitious in integrating them. On the one hand, such a multicultural elite will be in charge 
of the country in a more solid way. Like in Luxembourg, the elite might combine its dual-
integration (abroad and in Greenland) and the sovereignty of Greenland to siphon re-
sources from the neighbors into the country. On the other hand, the elite will be less dis-
tinct and deeper integrated with neighbor countries (in Greenland's case the Nordic coun-
tries). The foreign proletariat will probably also exist in this scenario, but it might be a 
little bit less isolated as some of it may come in via Scandinavia, fluent in a language 
usable also in Greenland. Geopolitically speaking, such a Greenland would continue to 
be oriented towards Europe (possibly even better integrated informally) and likely to be 
less left as much alone by other power centers as today (i.e., within a US sphere of interest 
with or without a Danish buffer). 
Finally, if Greenland succeeds in substituting English for Danish as a second 
language, and does so in a sufficiently solid way that most Greenlanders are functionally 
bilingual, Greenland will be like Iceland. Greenlanders will be open for business with 
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most of the world without intermediaries and, thereby, directly in control, as far as its 
educational resources take it. It will be necessary to recruit the most specialized human 
resources on a global labor market, but it will be easier to do so because the imports will 
not need to integrate fully linguistically. Hence, Greenland will still be an ethnically dis-
tinct 'members only club', as outsiders will not really be able to know what is going on 
behind the linguistic doors. Again, supplemented with a foreign proletariat, easier to in-
tegrate (more or less) in select individual cases via English, but also easier to segregate 
en masse. This Greenland is likely to be drawn into Anglo-Saxon North America, partic-
ularly as it gradually unravels its special ties to Denmark and, thereby, Scandinavia and 
Europe, while forgetting the Danish language.  
In 2016, a parliamentarian majority in Greenland seem to prefer prioritizing Eng-
lish. However, replicating the Icelandic success appears a daunting task, taking into con-
sideration the radically different points of departure for the two countries. The then Min-
ister of Education of Iceland in 2014 explained how the switch to English was really just 
a formalization of a practical process more or less completed:  
 
"It was not until 1999 that English switched places with Danish to be-
come the first foreign language taught in the Icelandic school system. 
Long before that, however, English had become the foreign language 
that received the greatest attention in the educational system and held a 
unique position when it came to stimulation and pupils’ motivation. For 
years now, children have been strongly motivated to learn English by 
their surroundings." (Minister of Education 2014). 
 
Contrast this to a recent evaluation of the Greenlandic primary school, reporting how,  
"a teacher and a superintendent from two small towns say: Danish and English are hard, 
because they [the pupils] do not meet [those languages] in their everyday life." (EVA 
2015, 44).  
However, the broad acceptance of the idea suggests that a narrative has been 
established which would allow Greenlandic identity to unfold in the form of a modern, 
national welfare state without negating itself by being dependent on the Danish other. As 
such, the narrative will come back to haunt the politicians every time an evaluation tells 
them that their latest school reform did not make it either. Making the human resources 
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